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Access to Justice for Collective and Diffuse
Rights: Theoretical Challenges and
Opportunities for Social Contract Theory
COLIN CRAWFORD*

Thinkers central to the formulation of contract theory in the
Western political tradition, notably Hobbes and Locke,' articulated
their theories in worlds marked by immense political and social strife.
Accordingly, their theories seek to address the ordering of political and
social conflict through the act of entering into civil society by
agreement-by contract, that is. Both writers, despite their considerable
differences, focus heavily on exploring the ideal relation between
sovereign and subject in a well-functioning civil society. As such, their
theories dedicate a great deal of time and energy to understanding and
defining the proper relation of the individual and the state. This is
unsurprising given the context in which they were working. Both men,
despite considerable differences in time, temperament, and point of
view, were interested to understand the conditions under which an
individual could be compelled to pledge obedience to the sovereign-the
sole state power of their era.
The : social contract underpinning the relationship between
individual and sovereign thus was understood by each philosopher to
require that an individual sacrifice their liberty in the state of nature to
enjoy.the benefits of civil society membership. As a result, at the heart
of classical contract theory exists a contradiction. On the one hand, a
republic is formed by and of many individuals in the service of their
collective protection and wellbeing. On the other hand, this collective
drive to. act so as to protect the common-wealth focuses
* Colin Crawford, Dean and Professor of Law, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law, University
of Louisville.
1. At the outset, I need explain citations to their work, and notably in the case of
Hobbes, for his masterwork, Leviathan and for Locke the Two Treatises of Government.
The formatting and even some of the language changes from edition to edition. The
ordering, however, does not. Therefore, for ease of reference, I provide the chapter and (in
the case of Locke) section numbers as well as the page numbers for the editions I used. In
this way, any reader will be able to identify the cites passages. In both cases, I follow the
orthography. of the editions I used.
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disproportionately on the role of individual members of civil society
qua individuals.
This way of conceiving the challenges of effective political
organization has consequences for understanding what sorts of claims
may be vindicated in a well-functioning civil society and how. To put the
point in anachronistic terms, the focus Hobbes and Locke give to civil
society organization has consequences for what sorts of access to justice
their theories contemplate. Thus, the contract theories identified with
thinkers like Hobbes and Locke contemplate the resolution of disputes
in which an individual is deprived of a right (such as the freedom to
contract) by another. That individual's recourse is then to protest the
deprivation of the right to an impartial third party (provided for and by
the sovereign authority). In other words, the standard model assumes a
direct cause-and-effect of harm suffered-vindication of the right. Civil
society is thus conceived to exist to arbitrate conflicts between
individuals, not between groups, or between an individual and a group.
This is not to say that the theory prohibits the application of its logic to
inter-group conflicts, but that is not the focus.
And what if the strife is of a different nature? Let us suppose, to
begin, that the political order in which I am a citizen has enacted laws
that assure me healthy living conditions and steady employment. Let us
suppose further that, despite those laws, my freedom to contract is
deprived because I am sick in bed with severe gastrointestinal disorders
because the water I drink is polluted by thousands of other users, large
and small, such that I cannot identify a specific agent of my harm?
Alternately, I might argue that my freedom to contract is infringed
because I live in a distant suburb not well served by affordable, safe
transportation alternatives, a situation that does not to admit of a
straightforward cause-and-effect explanation. In this situation, there
are many possible agents of my harm and causes of my deprived right.
Moreover, I might not understand the causes of my harm, or may
lack the information and tools to vindicate my right, although others in
my society might have that information and those tools. But a strict
reading of the access to justice mechanism contemplated in the theories
of classical contractarians like Hobbes and Locke does not address
such possibilities.
This analysis seeks to understand if and how classical contract
theory would address situations like the two examples above. The
analysis argues that these questions are worth asking because examples
like the two above and many others like them are increasingly common,
resulting not only in the deprivation of basic rights that Hobbes and
Locke would recognize (such as the freedom to contract), but also in the
deprivation of rights of more recent creation, rights that we today
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generally collect under the rubric of collective and diffuse rights. 2 This
paper seeks to explore whether classical contract theory provides a
workable framework for access to justice in the context of collective and
diffuse rights claims-situations in which the culprits are everyone at
once, or more frequently, the culprits are no one in particular.
This analysis is undertaken in the belief that any attempt today to
try and define what is meant by "access to justice" must take into
account collective and diffuse rights that may require vindication. If it
turns out that classical contract theory is inadequate to justify the
defense of collective and diffuse rights, then it will be necessary to
identify other theoretical grounds. Yet as the below analysis argues,
while classical contract theory may not provide all of the theoretical
architecture necessary to advance and sustain collective and diffuse
rights claims, it is nonetheless sufficient to defend the protection of
shared interests when they are denied.
In pursuing this analysis, however, I am acutely aware of two risks.
The first risk is the danger of anachronism. These thinkers have been
widely read to support views wholly outside the context in which they
articulated their theories. 3 In the context of a modern discussion of
collective and diffuse rights and the applicability of classical
contractarian thought to defend them, the concern about anachronism is
arguably especially acute. Collective and diffuse rights claims are often
used in the service of populations or social groups who have historically
been marginalized from mainstream political, social, and economic
opportunities. 4 Consequently, such rights claims may prove especially
helpful in addressing the widening social and economic inequalities
globally. 5 To be sure, concern about what we today call marginalized
populations was decidedly not of interest to thinkers like Hobbes and
Locke. Hobbes famously acknowledged the poverty that could constitute
human existence with his observation that "the life of man" could be
2. See Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil - A Model for Civil Law Countries, 51 AM.

J. COMP. L. 311, 349 (2003).
3. See, e.g., JOHN DUNN, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOHN LOCKE 5-8 (1982);
TULLY, A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY: JOHN LOCKE AND HIS ADVERSARIES 8 (1980).

JAMES

4. See, e.g., Michael R. Geroe & Thomas K. Gump, Hungary and a New Paradigmfor
the Protection of Ethnic Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe, 32 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 673 (1995) (describing the benefits of collective rights measures and the
success collective rights measures in protecting minorities in Europe).
5. See, e.g., Angel R. Oquendo, Justice for All: Certifying Global Class Actions, 16
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 71, 113-22 (2017) (making claims for the need to be
receptive to diffuse rights claims to protect widespread harms, based on mostly Latin
American examples); Zeev Segal, Do Israeli Arabs Have Collective Rights?, 12 J.L. Soc'Y
94 (2010) (asserting the claim that, by virtue of their special historical, cultural, and
political circumstances, Israeli Arabs deserve not only individual but also collective rights
recognition).
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"solitary, poore, [sic] nasty, brutish, and short."6 That condition of
poverty was also one of equality-equality of human capacity and ability
in the state of nature, prior to entering into civil society. As Hobbes
explained: "From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the
attaining of our Ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same
thing, which neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy, ... and in the way to
their End, (which is principally their owne conservation, and sometimes
7
their delectation only,), endeavour to destroy, or subdue one an other."
However, this world-poor and equal-was one that Hobbes spent the
better part of the Leviathan arguing that humans should seek to escape.
Thus, Hobbes can hardly be characterized as an advocate for what we
today call the principle of equality, which is a principal aim of collective
and diffuse rights advocates; this principle was simply not of concern
to him.
For Locke, similarly, equality was not positively valued because it
violated a divine order that he took pains to establish in the First
Treatise. 8 This view may have derived from his own personal
circumstances, as an up-and-coming member of the bourgeoise. Peter
Laslett, one of Locke's most lucid analysts, observes that Locke detested
idleness and, as Laslett writes, "[i]n his published works he showed
himself the determined enemy of beggars and the idle poor, who existed,
he thought, because of 'the relaxation of discipline and ... corruption of
manners'. He even implied that a working family had no right to expect
its children to be at leisure after the age of three." 9
Thus, it might be considered foolhardy to apply the ideas of classical
contract thinkers to reinforce the theoretical foundations for collective
and diffuse rights claims. At best, the thought of two leading classical
contract thinkers in English, Hobbes and Locke, bears no awareness of
6. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 89 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1991) (1651) [hereinafter HOBBES LEVIATHAN]. For an analysis of the connections and
tensions between contractualism and access to justice see Daniel Bonilla Maldonado, The
Right to Access to Justice: Its Conceptual Architecture, 27.1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
15 (2020) and Amnon Lev, Public Law, Precarity, and Access to Justice, 27.1 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 35 (2020). Bonilla's and Lev's articles are in dialogue between them
and with this article.
7. See HOBBES LEVIATHAN, supra note 6, at 87.
8. JOHN LOCKE, The First Treatise, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 118, at 245
(Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1689) ("Because in this of Gen. 27 Isaac
foretells that the Israelites, the Posterity of Jacob, should have Dominion over the
Edomites, the Posterity of Esau; therefore says our A Heirs are Lords of theirBrethren ...
9. Peter Laslett, Locke the Man and Locke the Writer: Introduction to JOHN LOcKE,
The First Treatise, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 16, 43 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1689) (quoting John Locke, An Essay on Poor Law, in
Political Essays 182, 184 (Mark Goldie ed., 1997).
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the possible significance of what we today term collective and diffuse
rights. At worst, however, these thinkers demonstrated a resistance to
the foundational aims of many, if not most, collective and diffuse rights
claims, namely to apply equitable arguments in search of more equal
social and economic circumstances. One might argue that such hostility
would disqualify the consideration of classical contract theory to develop
the justifications for collective and diffuse rights claims.
However, in response to such criticism, it is important, I think, to
emphasize the way in which classical contract ideas are examined. My
point is not to ask what Hobbes, Locke, or any other classical liberal
thinker said about collective and diffuse rights or even more basically
about modern notions like political, social, and economic equality or the
importance of poverty reduction aided by law and the intervention of
legal institutions. On the one hand, to ask how classical contract ideas
are relevant for building the architecture of modern collective and
diffuse rights claims may seem absurd; this was not a rights category
available to the canonical rights thinkers in their time. On the other
hand, I would argue that it is not absurd to engage in an analysis of
some of the foundational thinkers of classical contract theory, and in
particular to scrutinize their views about justice access-to the extent
we know them-and then to ask what else, if anything, is needed in the
architecture of access to justice to provide a solid structure for the
defense of collective and diffuse rights.
Two other points are worth making with respect to an analysis of
the views of the classical contractualist thinkers in the context of a
discussion about collective and diffuse rights. The first such point is
that while "collective and diffuse" interests were not an element of the
rights idiom of seventeenth-century England, both writers were keenly
aware of the need to protect the commonwealth-in other words, to
articulate political philosophies that treated individuals not only as
citizens, but also individuals as members of the polity, a collective
interest. The second point to be made is that, while the collective and
diffuse category was unavailable to each author, nothing in either of
their philosophies precludes application of their theories to these types
of rights. The key thing for each is that for resolution of disputes, an
impartial third-party exists to resolve differences. By this logic, it
matters not if the interests are individual or collective. Thus, just as the
theories of Hobbes and Locke have been successfully applied to
economic and social rights 1 0-- categories far beyond their ken or scope-

10. See, e.g., Tamar Ezer, A Positive Right to Protectionfor Children, 7 YALE HUM. RTS.
& DEV. L.J. 1, 2 n.8 (2004) (positing Locke's endorsement of children's rights).
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so too can they be applied to the analysis of collective and
diffuse rights.
The second analytical risk is that it is admittedly somewhat
artificial to focus only on Hobbes and Locke. Classical contract theory
certainly encompasses more than those two thinkers." The aim of these
reflections is modest, namely to advance a contribution to questions of
access to justice and identify theoretical gaps that may need
elaboration. For my purposes here, Hobbes and Locke are thus proxies
for the larger contract theory tradition and its handling of questions of
access to justice.
This analysis consists of three principal parts. First, it briefly
reviews the classical contract account that explains how and why
individuals enter civil society, found in the writings of both Hobbes and
Locke. The analysis then examines the limited extent to which classical
contract theory treats questions of rights vindication or, in more modern
terms, with questions of access to justice. Second, the analysis examines
the nature of collective and diffuse rights claims and will make a case
for their importance in the modern world. Third, the analysis seeks to
identify arguments from the classical account that might be useful in
the context of trying to vindicate what we now call collective and diffuse
rights. In this connection, this reflection analyzes the possibilities for
and limitations of, if any, classical contract theory to accommodate
modern collective and diffuse rights claims. Without question, the
analysis will thus at times paint with a very broad brush. However, the
aim is not to provide an exhaustive analysis of the response (or not) of
classical contract theory to the challenge presented by collective and
diffuse rights questions, but rather to begin to trace out the relation of
classical contract theory to these rights claims, which are of evergrowing importance today.
CLASSICAL CONTRACT THEORY AND RIGHTS VINDICATION

At its most elemental formulation, classical contract theory posits a
simple trade-off: men enter civil society, even though it deprives them of
their absolute personal liberty, because it is safer than living without its
protections in the state of nature. Moreover, the physical safety
characteristic of civil society is accompanied by other advantages,
including advantages born of political, social, and economic common
purpose. When considering the relevance of Hobbesian theory for
11. See generally, e.g., JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND
DISCOURSES (G. D. H. Cole trans., J. M. Dent & Sons 1973) (1762) (assessing concerns
about political practices and encouraging the shift of governing power from the monarchy
to the individual sovereign).
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advancing collective and diffuse rights claims, this emphasis on common
welfare-protection of what he and his contemporaries called the
"Common-wealth"i -must be judged to be of central importance.
Hobbes
In De Cive, Hobbes's masterwork prior to publication of Leviathan,
he tellingly wrote as follows:
Outside the commonwealth every man has a right to all
things, but on the terms that he may enjoy nothing. In a
commonwealth every man enjoys a limited right in
security. Outside the commonwealth anyone may be
killed and robbed by anyone; within a commonwealth
only by one person. Outside the commonwealth, we are
protected only by our own strength; within by the
strength of all. Outside the commonwealth, no one is
certain of the fruits of his industry; within the
commonwealth all men are. To sum up: outside the
commonwealth is the empire of the passions, war, fear,
poverty, nastiness, solitude, barbarity, ignorance,
savagery; within the commonwealth is the empire of
reason, peace, security, wealth, splendor, society, good
taste, the sciences and good-will. 13
The above passage, which has echoes throughout Hobbes's work, 14 is
of interest for at least two reasons in the context of the present analysis.

12. On this spelling see, for example, infra note 16. See also, e.g., AMNON LEV,
SOVEREIGNTY AND LIBERTY: A STUDY OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF POWER 7 (2014) ("This is
the problem to which Hobbes' political theory offers a solution: his commonwealth which is
organized around. the contemporaneous genesis of civil order and law is self-contained as a
jurisdictional unit and need not refer beyond itself to settle any matter of law."); QUENTIN
SKINNER, HOBBES AND REPUBLICAN LIBERTY 147-48 (2008) (including an illustration of the
Great Seal of the English Commonwealth).
13. THOMAS HOBBES, ON THE CITIZEN 116 (Richard Tuck & Michael Silverthorne eds.,
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1642).
14. HOBBES LEVIATHAN, supro note 6, at 117-21 (arguing, inter alia, that "the Lawes of
Nature . . . of themselves, without the terrour of some Power, to cause them to be
observed, are contrary to our naturall Passions .... Therefore notwithstanding the Lawes
of Nature . . . if there be no Power erected, or not great enough for our security; every man
will, and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men.
... The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them from the
invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another . . . is, to conferre all their power
and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, . . . to beare their Person; ...
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First, it reveals Hobbes's notion of harm, which implies a single causeand-effect relationship when a right is infringed. This is suggested by
the argument that within the commonwealth murder or robbery can be
committed against an individual "by only one person." 15 If that is so, it
is surely because the crime will trigger the levers of justice against the
errant individual. As noted above, a key consideration for Hobbes was to
explain the circumstance under which an impartial third party-the
sovereign-would be invoked to maintain order as between individuals
within the commonwealth. Second, the commonwealth's protection of its
members ("within by the strength of all"), along with the assumption
that industrious men will be compensated for their labors ("within the
commonwealth all men are [certain of the fruit of their industry]")
indicates Hobbes' conception of the social contract in operation;
individuals become citizens with the expectation of various rights,
including protection of their physical and personal wellbeing and the
ability to pursue their betterment.16 Notably, however, in the context of
this paper it is worth stressing Hobbes's concern with the strength of
the collectivity. At least implicitly, this suggests potential claims in
defense of infringements of rights affecting the collective. To be sure, for
Hobbes these rights are not without limit. On the contrary:
[tjhe Liberty of a Subject, lyeth therefore only in those
things, which in regulating their actions, the Soveraign
hath praetermitted: such as is the Liberty to buy, and
sell, and otherwise contract with one another; to choose
their own aboad, their own diet, their own trade of life,
and institute their children as they themselves think fit;
[and] the like. 17
That is, the sovereign chooses what bundle of rights are available in
a given civil society.18 But Hobbes is clear that civil society is
accompanied by rights expressed in the form of laws. In the context of

.

and therein to submit their Wills, every one to his Will, and their Judgments, to his
Judgment.").
15. ON THE CITIZEN, supra note 13, at 116.
16. Id. at 116; see, e.g., id. at 170-76.
17. HOBBES LEVIATHAN, supra note 6, at 148.
18. See id. Hobbes in fact acknowledges what we would now call an argument in favor
of cultural relativism. Elsewhere in Leviathan, for example, for example he acknowledges
but dismisses for himself the notion of "fundamental" laws to be observed by all civil
societies. According to Hobbes, a "Fundamentall Law in every Common-Wealth is that. .
by which Subjects are bound to uphold whatsoever power is given to the Sovereign,...
without which the Common-wealth cannot stand." Id. at 200.
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the present discussion, this raises a subsequent question, namely: what
if these rights are infringed?
Hobbes had exceptional respect for the sovereign power, especially if
it was embodied in a sovereign monarch. He makes clear in Leviathan
that the price of entering civil society is submitting to the sovereign
authority.1 9 One cannot object to the sovereign authority because it is
the manifestation of one's own choice and identity as a member of a
secure civil society. Consequently, he articulates what we now
characterize as the doctrine of sovereign immunity: "[W]hatsoever he
doth, it can be no injury to any of his Subjects; nor ought he to be by any
of them accused of Injustice .

. .

. [B]y this Institution of a Common-

wealth, every particular man is Author of all the Soveraigne doth; and
consequently he that complaineth of injury from his Soveraigne,
complaineth of that whereof he himselfe is Author; and therefore ought
not to accuse any man but himselfe; no nor himselfe of injury; because
to do injury to ones selfe, is impossible." 20 As will be seen in Part II, the
absolute affirmation of sovereign decisions that these words reflect,
such that citizens cannot claim to be harmed by the body they
effectively create and constitute, is problematic for modern collective
and diffuse rights claims.
This is not to say, however, that Hobbes does not allow for the
possibility that a citizen may seek to vindicate a right denied. On the
contrary, to maintain the publique peace the sovereign possesses "the
whole power of prescribing the Rules, whereby every man may know,
what Goods he may enjoy, and what Actions he may doe, without being
molested by any of his fellow Subjects." 21 The rules, the laws established
by the sovereign, focus first and foremost on the power to contract
(always of central importance to Hobbes). Hobbes is clear "that in all
kinds of actions . . . men have the Liberty, of doing what their own

reasons suggest, for the most profitable to themselves." 22 Even within
the commonwealth, for Hobbes, this affords each individual with some

19. See, e.g., id. at 122 ("And Consequently they that have already Instituted a
Common-wealth, being thereby bound by Covenant, to own the Actions, and Judgments of
one, cannot lawfully make a new Covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient to any
other, in any thing whatsoever, without his permission.").
20. Id. at 124.
21. Id. at 125. As the lawyer says in Behemoth, men in themselves are quite incapable
of defining what is right and wrong: "Common people know nothing of right or wrong by
their own meditation; they must therefore be taught the grounds of their duty, and the
reasons why calamities ever follow disobedience to their lawful sovereigns." 6 THOMAS
HOBBES, Behemoth: The History of Causes of the Civil Wars of England, in THE ENGLISH
WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES OF MALMESBURY 161, 343 (Sir William Molesworth, Bart. ed.,
Scientia Verlag Aalen 1996) (1839).
22. HOBBES LEVIATHAN, supra note 6, at 147.
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degree of discretion and freedom of choice, such as "to choose their own
aboad, their own diet, their own trade of life, and institute their children
as they themselves think fit; [and] the like." 23 To the extent that the
quoted language here focuses on well-being, it provides an opening to
think about the assertion of what we now call collective and diffuse
rights claims. For example, Hobbes understood as essential the need to
choose one's own diet. 24 A collective or diffuse rights claim, in the
modern context, can be imagined whereby, due to fraud in the use of
ingredients or environmental contamination, that need is interfered
when depriving me of that right. Clearly Hobbes was not thinking of
such group claims, claims based on facts far from his reality. At the
same time, however, he was quite clear that the reason to enter into
civil society was to provide benefits to the individual, in the form of
security of his person, family, and community. Thus, while collective
and diffuse claims were not part of his vernacular, the demands they
represent can certainly be understood as within the wide circumference
of social and economic rights his theory sought to defend.
When one violates a rule and injures another, says Hobbes, a citizen
then has recourse to "the Right of Judicature." 25 But Hobbes offers little
more with respect to what we now call access to justice. A citizen
possesses a right to seek redress for an injury that violates a rule
derived from the sovereign authority. The judge of the dispute must be
an impartial third party required to decide cases on the basis of facts or
established legal principles. As he wrote in Philosophical Elements on
the Citizen:
[I]t is the responsibility of the same Sovereign power to
come up with rules or measures that will be common to
all ...

so that each man may know by them what he

should call his own and what another's, what he should
call just and unjust . . . . These rules or measures are
normally called the civil laws or laws of the
commonwealth .

..

. And CIVIL LAWS ...

are nothing

other than commands about the citizen's future actions
from the one who is endowed with sovereign authority
[summa potestas].26

23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 148.
Id.
Id. at 125.
ON THE CITIZEN, supra note 13, at 79.

COLLECTIVE AND DIFFUSE RIGHTS

69

To be sure, Hobbes considers the role and responsibilities of judges
as impartial executors of the sovereign's commands. 27 But that is not
all. The following passage from the Leviathan, in the context of a
consideration of collective and diffuse rights, is of particular interest:
The safety of the People, requireth further, from him
[i.e. the sovereign], or them that have the Soveraign
Power, that Justice be equally administred to all degrees
of People; that is, that as well the rich, and mighty, as
poor and obscure persons, may be righted of the injuries
done them; so as the great, may have no greater hope of
impunity, when they doe violence, dishonour, or any
Injury to the meaner sort, than when one of these, does
the like to one of them: For in this consisteth Equity; to
which, as being a Precept of the Law of Nature, a
Soveraign is as much subject, as any of the meanest of
his People. All breaches of the Law, are offences against
the Common-wealth: but there be some, that are also
against private Persons. 28
For purposes of the present discussion, the passage merits attention
for at least two reasons. First, the focus on equity indicates Hobbes's
belief that judicial action should have as a goal redistribution of
resources when harm occurs. Second, it is notable that Hobbes
understood legal violations to be harms first against the collective and
only in the second instance that any such violation may also be against
individuals. These reasons are of interest because they both
characterize challenges present in the assertion of modern collective and
diffuse interest claims. 29 However, the passage continues as follows:
Those [offenses] that the concern the Common-wealth
onely, may without breach of Equity be pardoned; for
every man may pardon what is done against himselfe,
according to his own discretion. But an offense against a
private man, cannot in Equity be pardoned, without the
consent of him that is injured; or reasonable
30

satisfaction.

27. See, e.g.,

HOBBES LEVIATHAN, supra note 6, at

28. Id. at 237.
29. See infra Part II.

30.

HOBBES LEVIATHAN, supra note 6, at

237-38.

108-09, 125.
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For the assertion of collective and diffuse rights, which often but not
exclusively involve public officials, this language is problematic. Since
the social contract for Hobbes means that the individual becomes part of
the collective-what we would call the "public"-interest, the individual
cannot claim against that shared interest. The highly individualistic
nature of grievance thus creates an impediment to the assertion of such
modern claims if using a Hobbesian analytical framework.
Indeed, Hobbes's view needs to be stressed. One cannot claim an
injury by the Sovereign-to make such a claim was, for him,
tantamount to saying: "I have injured myself." The nature of the modern
administrative state is, of course, vastly different from the reach of the
seventeenth-century sovereign. Nonetheless, given the nature and
complexity of the modern administrative state, modern collective and
diffuse rights' claims often include not merely private transgressions
affecting large groups, but also public errors of action and of omission.
In this respect, however, even Hobbes provides some theoretical basis
for challenges to sovereign authority. This is because the sovereign
authority is not absolute. On the one hand, it is true that in Hobbes's
political universe subjects cannot advance claims against the sovereign:
For he that doth any thing by authority from another,
doth therein no injury to him by whose authority he
acteth: But by this Institution of a Common-wealth,
every particular man is Author of all the Soveraigne
doth; and consequently he that complaineth of injury
from his Soveraigne, complaineth of that whereof he
himselfe is Author; and therefore ought not to accuse
any man but himselfe; no nor himselfe of injury; because
31
to do injury to ones selfe, is impossible.
This is at odds with the nature of many modern collective and
diffuse rights claims, where a claim may be brought as easily against
the sovereign as against private parties. 32
Yet on the other hand, Hobbes also articulates a position that could
allow for the defense of a collective or diffuse claim because he identifies
absolute limits on sovereign power.3 3 "The sovereign may not, he says,
31. Id. at 124.
32. A common collective claim in the United States, for example, concerns challenges to
federal and state taxing authority and activity. See, e.g., Charlotte Crane, Maintaining
Class Actions in Tax Cases: Why Have FederalLitigants Been So Much Less Successful?,
11 PIrr. TAX REv. 179, 182-83 (2014) (examining, inter alia, questions of sovereign
immunity and its limits in such class actions).
33. See HOBBES LEVIATHAN, supra note 6, at 151.
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order me to kill myself or another; the sovereign cannot order me to
incriminate myself." 34 Moreover, says Hobbes:
If the Soveraign command a man (though justly
condemned,) to kill, wound, or mayme himselfe; or not to
resist those that assault him; or to abstain from the use
of food, ayre, medicine, or any other thing, without
which he cannot live; yet hath that man the Liberty to
disobey. 35

But what about the reverse circumstance? What if, for example, the
sovereign is the one responsible for distributing food, air, or water that
endangers life, what then? This is not a question Hobbes asked. But it
does not press his theory too far into service of a view he could not
endorse to suggest that even the staunch defender of sovereign
monarchical power would have had qualms about action private or
public that endangered the well-being of the sovereign's subjects.
Locke
It bears repeating that these reflections need not examine the
considerable differences between two thinkers as different as Hobbes
and Locke. 36 The aim here is merely to identify the contours of their
ideas about access to justice, particularly as they might relate to the
advancement of modern collective and diffuse rights claims. For Locke
too, the social contract is of central importance. 3 7 What merits special
attention with respect to Locke's theories in this context, however, is the
role that property plays in his notion of a well-functioning civil society.
To that end, these reflections will concentrate principally on Chapter V
of the Second Treatise, which outlines Locke's theory of property. In
addition, it is useful briefly to reiterate Locke's understanding of the
limits of individual action when one enters into civil society, a key to
appreciating what access to justice appears to have meant to him.
The focus on Locke's notion of property is justified here for two
reasons. First, Locke demonstrates a considerable interest in the
obligations of citizens to one another even as mediated by the property
right. In this, he can-somewhat anachronistically-be labeled a
defender of what we now know as resource conservation. Inasmuch as
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Although, as John Dunn has demonstrated, the alleged differences between them
may be less consequential than is sometimes argued. See DUNN, supra note 3, at 77-83.
37. Maldonado, supra note 6, at 10-11.
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collective and diffuse rights typically involve a misuse or
misappropriation of resources, this discussion merits attention here.
Second, a focus on Locke's conception of property also demonstrates the
very different world in which he thought and lived, a world in which
resources were still relatively abundant. This fact is of enormous
importance in assessing the utility of his thought for theorizing a case
for justice access in the case of collective and diffuse rights claims.
Locke demonstrates, in the Second Treatise, a formidable degree of
respect for nature, unsurprisingly perhaps given the depth of his
Christian faith and belief that all things natural had been created by
the Christian God. 38 As he writes: "Nothing was made by God for Man
to spoil or destroy."3 9 Even when, by one's labor, one creates private
property distinct from the common, an individual bears a responsibility
to be a good steward of the resources. Thus, Locke declares, "[a]s much
land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates and can use the product
of, so much is his property. He by his labour does, as it were, enclose it
from the common." 40 Moreover, such labor is a divine obligation: "God,
when he gave the World in common to all Mankind, commanded Man
also to labour .

. .

. God and his Reason commanded him to subdue the

Earth." 41 However, "subdue" was not for Locke a synonym for exploit
mercilessly. As he continued to explain: "i.e. improve it for the benefit of
life

.

...

"42

Despite property being made private through being demarcated or
fenced off in some way, and then tilled, planted, improved, and
cultivated, such that the property becomes that of he who so manages it,
Locke insists that private property ownership in and of itself does not
result in resource exploitation. Resources in his world are abundant and
exist only to satisfy necessities. Conflict over their use is not
contemplated by Locke:
No Body [sic] could think himself injur'd by the drinking
of another Man, though he took a good Draught, who
had a whole River of the same Water left him to quench
his thirst. And the Case of Land and Water, where there
is enough of both, is perfectly the same. 43

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, supra note 8, § 31, at 308.
Id.
Id. § 32, at 309.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 33, at 309.
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At this point, Locke's argument encounters a tricky turn due to, as
he acknowledges, two factors, namely "money and commerce." Money
and commerce enable some to purchase more than others, and the fact
that as population grows and land is appropriated by some, what is left
may be less desirable: "the remainder, after such inclosure, would not be
as good to the rest of the Commoners as the whole was, when they could
all make use of the whole: whereas in the beginning and first peopling of
the great Common of the World, it was quite otherwise." 44 As Locke
explains it, before money, commerce, and population growth, there was
enough to go around. But money has the effect, he acknowledges, to
alter "the intrinsick value of things, which depends only on their
usefulness to the Life of Man." 45 The challenge for Locke then becomes

how to square this new potential for acquisitiveness with his insistence
that in a divinely ordered world resources will be sufficiently distributed
for those who labor, and also that nothing in God's creation can by man
be spoiled or destroyed.
Locke resolves this challenge by insisting that injustice is avoided
nonetheless because those who labor mightily will never want. Even
with what "[m]en had agreed, that a little piece of yellow Metal, which
would keep without wasting or decay," a thing that can be valued the
same as "a great piece of Flesh, or a whole heap of Corn," Locke insists,
not entirely satisfactorily, that injustice is avoided because, after all,
"[m]en had a Right to appropriate, by their Labour, each one to himself,
as much of the things of Nature, as he could use: Yet this could not be
much, nor to the Prejudice of others, where the same plenty was still
left, to those who would use the same Industry." 46
If Locke's treatment of the inequality produced by the introduction
of money-based commerce (a phenomenon of which he was mightily
aware) 47 is rather breezy and sometimes shallow, the comment is
nonetheless of interest for how he understood the natural world and the
limits of property. Quite unlike our modern view of resources being
limited, Locke's worldview, reflected in the language quoted above,
44. Id. § 35, at 310.
45. Id. § 37, at 312.
46. Id.
47. Lev, supra note 6, at 10. However, it need be remembered that the world in which
Locke lived still was not dominated by money and commerce as we know it: "[Y]et there
are still great Tracts of Ground to be found, which . . . lie waste, and are more than the
People, who dwell on it, do, or can make use of and so still lie in common. Tho' this can
scarce happen amongst that part of Mankind, that have consented to the Use of Money."
LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, supra note 8, § 45, at 317 (italics in original).
The inequality triggered by the growing use of money and dependence on commerce, he
makes clear subsequently, is based on the "tacit and voluntary consent" of all men. Id. §
50, at 320.
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reveals quite the opposite position. For Locke, access to resources was
not the issue. Like Hobbes, he was closer to a world of self-sustenance
than we, and for him the question was not resource availability, but
rather taming and manipulating wild and unproductive nature for
human betterment. As he wrote in words now quoted by virtually every
Anglo-American teacher of common law property:
[Tihat he who appropriates land to himself by his
labour, does not lessen but increase the common stock of
mankind. For the provisions serving to the support of
humane life, produced by one acre of inclosed and
cultivated land, are (to speak much within compasse)
ten times more, than those, which are yielded by an acre
of Land, of an equal richnesse, lyeing wast in common.4 8
However, in a discussion of the consequences of Lockean theory for
collective and diffuse rights claims, it is also worth quoting the language
that both precedes and that follows his famous quote. Before
articulating what we now label the Lockean 'labor theory of value," 49
Locke made clear his view that individual resource use was conditioned
upon leaving enough for other members of the collective:
Men had a Right to appropriate, by their Labour, each
one to himself, as much of the things of Nature, as he
could use: Yet this could not be much, nor to the
Prejudice of others, where the same plenty was still left,
to those who would use the same Industry. To which let
me add, that he who appropriates land to himself by his
labour, does not lessen but increase the common stock of
mankind.5 0
Moreover, Locke concludes this section by expressing a concern that
improvement and cultivation be directed not just to individual benefit,
but also to reduce the misery of all:
For I aske whether in the wild woods and uncultivated
wast of America left to Nature, without any
improvement, tillage or husbandry, a thousand acres

48. LOCKE, The Second Treatiseof Government, supra note 8, § 37, at 312.
49. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL
L. REV. 531, 536 nn.22-23 (2005).
50. LOCKE, The Second Treatiseof Government, supra note 8, § 37, at 312.
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will yield the needy and wretched inhabitants as many
conveniencies of life as ten acres of equally fertile land
doe in Devonshire where they are well cultivated? 5

-

In the context of discussing the capacity of Lockean theory to
embrace collective and diffuse rights claims, his focus on the value of
assuring life's "conveniences" for the "needy and wretched" merits
attention.52 Again, the social contract, though-as in Hobbesunderstood as a relation between individual and sovereign, has a
decidedly larger, extra-individual social purpose.
For Locke, moreover, in the state of nature, "[b]efore the
Appropriation of Land," individuals have a responsibility not to waste.
In the state of nature, says Locke, if hunted animals "perished, in his
Possession, without their due use; if the Fruits rotted, or the Venison
putrified, before he could spend it, he offended against the common Law
of Nature, and was liable to be punished; he invaded his Neighbour's
share, for he had no Right, farther than his Use called for any of them,
and they might serve to afford him the Conveniencies of Life."53
But even after "the Possession of Land," individuals for Locke
remained responsible not to waste:
The same measures governed .

.

. : Whatsoever he tilled

and reaped, laid up and made use of, before it spoiled,
that was his peculiar Right; whatsoever he enclosed, and
could feed, and make use of, the Cattle and Product was
also his. But if either the Grass of his Inclosure rotted on
the Ground, or the Fruit of his planting perished
without gathering, and laying up, this part of the Earth,
notwithstanding his Inclosure, was still to be looked
[upon] as Waste, and might be the Possession of any
other. 54
Moreover, irrespective of the state in which individuals find
themselves, Locke is conscious of the need to commit no harm, either to
another or to all others. 55 Even prior to the widespread use of money, for
example, he says that if a man:

51. Id.
52. Id.

53. Id. § 37, at 313.
54. Id. § 38, at 313.
55. See id. § 46, at 318.
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[A]lso bartered away Plumbs that would have rotted in a
Week, for Nuts that would last good for his eating a
whole Year, he did no injury; he wasted not the common
Stock; destroyed no part of the portion of Goods that
belonged to others, so long as nothing perished uselessly
in his hands. 56
Thus, for Locke, the imperative to steward resources carefully
forms a central part of his vision.57 This is true for him with respect to
human beings at any stage of development-from the state of nature on.
In short, the need to not harm the interests of others constitutes a
central concern of his theory.
As will be seen in Part III, while these considerations can hardly be
understood to defend a principle of access to justice for the assertion of
collective and diffuse rights as we understand those words today, they
provide important grounds to use Lockean theory in the defense of
collective and diffuse claims. Nonetheless, it would be a wild
exaggeration to suggest that Locke advanced a collectivist notion of
access to justice. For him, "Justice gives every Man a Title to the
product of his honest Industry."5 8 This idea encapsulates his
contractarian idea: labor produces a right in property and a violation of
the title in that property entitles an individual who believes he has
been harmed to seek vindication of the right. Such a concept does not, at
first blush, allow room for asserting rights to things one has not labored
to produce-clean air and water, for example. Moreover, the notion of
who can assert claims is clearly limited to those who have labored;
indeed, Locke takes pains to identify the ownership rights in the
products of natural resources with great specificity: "[Tihe bread
belongs naturally to the baker, the timber to the timberman, the leather
to the tanner, and so on."59 As Tully emphasizes, this leads to the
conclusion for Locke that "[t]he conventional arrangements for payment
can thus be made in accordance with the natural principle of justice:
60
every man has a title to the product of his honest industry."
On its face, such a notion would appear to leave little room for one
seeking justice on another's behalf or to suggest some notion of
ownership or even possession where labor is not involved, as is required

56. Id.
57. See id.
58. LOCKE, The First Treatise, supra note 8, § 42, at 188. This statement is quoted by
Tully, TULLY, supra note 3, at 118, who calls this "a first principle of justice" for Locke.
59. TULLY, supra note 3, at 145; see also LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government,
supra note 8, §§ 42-44, at 315-17.
60. TULLY, supra note 3, at 145.
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for the successful assertion of some collective or group claims today.
However, the strong emphasis on respecting natural creation and the
imperative not to despoil it to the harm of others is also a central part of
Locke's thinking, as shown. This too must be remembered. In other
words, while Locke-like Hobbes before him-was in the first instance
focused on exploring the individual's role in civil society, especially
apropos the sovereign, he was also fundamentally interested in showing
what unites individuals in a commonwealth. Given that fact, it is not a
far cry to acknowledge that the theory can, within limits, support
modern claims for collective and diffuse rights. Importantly, Locke's
theory provides a theoretical justification for such claims beyond that of
Hobbes. Famously, Locke's rejection of Sir Robert Filmer was in part a
rejection of Filmer's belief that an "absolute monarch" was entitled to
exercise "his right of sovereignty over his undifferentiated possessions
in accordance with nothing but his 'unbounded will."'6 1 Instead, Locke's
defense of the ultimate rightness of divine creation and natural law
allows him to shift focus on collective decisions for the common good.
For Locke, men abandon the freedom of the state of nature for "[lt]he
great and chief end ... of Mens uniting into Commonwealths," namely
"the Preservation of their Property."62 Thus, by contrast to Hobbes,
Locke's theory does not clearly explore the limits of sovereign authority.
The focus on ends rather than means, in the context of consideration of
collective and diffuse rights claims, thus allows for a theoretical
justification for claims that harm property irrespective of the status of
the actor. Indeed, in the famous last paragraphs of The Second Treatise,
Locke makes clear that even in a monarchy, "in a matter where the Law
is silent, or doubtful, and the thing [should] be of great Consequence, I
should think the proper Umpire, in such a Case, should be the Body of
the People."63 I do not mean here to suggest that this is a robust defense

of collective and diffuse rights claims. To say so would be, once again,
anachronistic. I do suggest, however, that this ample language provides
a solid basis for such claims, which often proceed in cases where the law
is silent or doubtful and where the people's well-being is compromised.
To explore the consequences of these assertions further, it is
important briefly to explore what exactly is meant by the phrase
collective and diffuse rights. I now turn to that question.

61 .Id. at 57.
62. LocKE, The Second Treatise of Government, supra note 8, § 124, at 368-69.
63. Id. § 242, at 445.
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The phrase collective and diffuse rights refer to any situation that
"affects an identifiable group of people (collective interests) or a
64
nondeterminable group of people (diffuse interests)." Thus:

.

[A] collective right is possessed by a group whose
members are linked to each other (or to the class
opponent) by a pre-existing legal relationship. . .
Because the nature and character of pre-existing legal
relationships are often ascertainable, it should not be too
difficult--at least theoretically--to identify members of a
group having a collective right. Members of such a group
are expected to be more cohesive because often all
business
same
the
with
contracted
members
organization (the class opponent).
In contrast, a diffuse right is possessed by a group whose
members are linked not by a common legal relationship
but only by the facts of a particular transaction or
occurrence. Such a group is usually larger, less cohesive
65
and its members often are not as easily identifiable.
For example, a collective right would be at issue "when a bank, a
credit card company or a school charges excessive or illegal fees to its
clients, or a health insurance company refuses to cover treatment for
some diseases . .."66 By contrast, a diffuse right would be implicated
when a chemical plant exploded, sending plumes of toxic material into
the air and affecting people and environmental resources over an
entire region.
Four factors help account for the increasing importance of collective
and diffuse rights claims as a category over the past two centuries.
First, industrialization has increased the possibility of environmental
harms, such as contamination of air, water, and soil, which can have
damaging effects on human and plant health. Second, exponential
population growth during this period means that more people are living
ever more densely together-increasing their joint risk from humanmade and natural harms. Third, and related to each of the prior factors,
64. Enrique GonzAlez Mac Dowell, Judicial Action for the Protection of Collective
Rights and Its Legal Impact- A Case Study, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 644, 644 (2002).
65. Robert A. Weninger, The VW Diesel Emissions Scandal and the Spanish Class
Action, 23 COLuM. J. EUR. L. 91, 111 (2016).
66. Antonio Gidi, supra note 2, at 356.
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is the factor of urbanization. In 2008, for the first time in global history,
a majority of the world's residents were classified as urban, a trend that
promises only to continue. 67 Indeed, one feature of urbanization that
distinguishes urban populations from those of prior generations is that
more people than ever before are unknown to others where they live out
their lives. This means that-as indicated by the above examples of
collective harms-the possibility for fraudulent actions committed by
actors against large swaths of populations is greater than ever before.
This reality leads to the next factor, namely the move to an almost
entirely transactional economy, in which people are not responsible for
producing the food they consume, making their own clothing and daily
necessities, or constructing their own dwellings. As a result, this factor
creates the potential for more widespread harms to large groups of
people as consumers. Taken together, these factors create conditions
requiring legal categories like collective and diffuse rights.
All these factors, of course, did not begin to profoundly shape life in
Europe until well after the death of classical contract theorists like
Hobbes and Locke. One changing feature that marked their world was,
however, the shift from a barter economy to a transactional economy.
Each philosopher focused extensively on the implications of this shift to
currency-dependence in peoples' lives and its effects on the development
of civil society. At a minimum, this development anticipates and
triggers many of the rights challenges that characterize our era,
challenges that Hobbes or Locke could scarcely have imagined.
The enforcement of collective and diffuse rights questions is
bedeviled by several concerns. As with most "class action" devices, the
principal questions concern class membership and timing.68 With
respect to membership, the central question involves determining who
has been affected. In the case of a collective action involving the
examples given above-of charging high or illegal fees to clients-this is
easy enough since the status of a client determines membership in a
class. This is more complicated, however, in the case of an
environmental harm that damages a specific place, such as a contained
toxic spill. This question is equally complicated unraveling the case
introducing defective merchandise into the stream of commerce, in
which a wide range of loosely connected players share responsibility for

67. UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND, UNFPA STATE OF WORLD POPULATION 2007:
UNLEASHING
THE
POTENTIAL
OF
URBAN
GROWTH
1
(2007),

https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdfl695 filenamesowp2007_eng.pdf.
68. See, e.g., Robert H. KIonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U.L. REV. 729,
753 (2013) (discussing challenges of timing); Geoffrey C. Shaw, Note, Class
Ascertainability, 124 YALE L.J. 2354, 2360-61 (2015) (discussing challenges of defining
class membership).
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creating the harm. This is to ask, for example, whether only workers at
a plant at which a toxic spill occurred can be considered members of the
collective, or whether that circle can be widened to include other
professions (e.g., fisherman whose catch is poisoned by a spill), or even
to those who lived near the site of the spill. At this point, the questions
of class membership reveal the overlap between affected parties with
both collective and diffuse interests, as the potential to widen the circle
of those with affected diffuse interests can be great. For purposes of
defining members to a class of diffuse interests, moreover, there are
complicated questions of causation.69 Suppose I have a chronic
pulmonary condition that is aggravated by a toxic air plume of chlorine
gas. In that instance, disentangling the cause of my harm can be
70
considerable. Similar challenges occur with respect to timing. In the
U.S., for example, many statutes of limitations for contract fraud expire
within three years of the fraudulent act. While the statutes typically
don't expire until three years after the fraudulent harm is discovered,
what if the symptoms of an environmental harm are suspected but not
confirmed until years after the event?
Similarly, what if the symptoms of an environmental harm are
suspected but not confirmed until years after the event? Moreover, even
in the immediate aftermath of a relatively straightforward infringement
of a collective interest-say an event involving a discrete set of clients
whose shared financial interests are defrauded-timing questions and
concerns include the question of how quickly after an event an
71
individual must declare their interest to be included in the class. As
will be explored in Part III below, these issues are neither well
addressed by classical liberal theory nor by the principles of access to
justice that follow from them, notably with respect to the form in which
the right is vindicated.

69. See, e.g., David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice
by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 563-73 (1987).
70. See LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, supra note 8, § 124, at 368-69.
71. There is a vast periodical literature exploring the consequences of such rules. See,

e.g., Elizabeth Cosenza, Dura-tion: A New Paradigm for Construing the Statute of
Limitations in Securities FraudClass Actions, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 681, 683, 686-87 (2010);
Joshua D. Ratner, Comment, Stockholders' Holding Claim Class Actions Under State Law
After the Uniform Standards Act Of 1998, 68 U. CI. L. REV. 1035, 1037 n.16 (2001)
(discussing different standards for triggering statutes of limitations as between U.S. state
and federal courts).
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EXPLANATORY POWER OF CLASSICAL CONTRACT ARGUMENTS
IN DEFENSE OF COLLECTIVE AND DIFFUSE RIGHTS

Clearly, collective and diffuse rights claims address social and
economic challenges in a world that classical contract theorists like
Hobbes and Locke could not have imagined. The social and political
strife they knew was produced by conflicts like those between adherents
of the divine right of kings versus believers in (typically divinely
ordered) constitutional order and parliamentary power. The nature and
causes of such conflicts are of an entirely different order than those that
might produce a collective or diffuse rights claim. Nonetheless, collective
and diffuse rights claims, if left unable to be vindicated, could result in
mass political and social strife that thinkers like Hobbes and Locke
would have recognized, to their horror. Consider, for example, the
dislocation of large numbers of people from their livelihoods and
displacement and insecurity of those persons as a result of a toxic spill.
As suggested in Part I, while it was not the central aspect of either
Hobbes's or Locke's thought, both of them were interested in the
benefits and consequences of entering into the common-wealth, a form
of collective interest. Additionally, they were interested in defining what
the conditions were for individual membership in and adherence to the
rules of a polity. Maintaining the collective, and respecting not only
individual liberties but also collective order and the dignity of all
members in the collective mattered to both thinkers. This fact suggests
that at a minimum, classical contract thought may give some support to
the legal architecture needed to assert successful collective and diffuse
rights claims. Therefore, this Part will conclude these reflections with
an assessment of the explanatory power, if any, of classical contract
theories for access to justice in the service of collective and diffuse
rights claims.
In fact, upon review, it may be said that classical contract theory
contains the seeds for successful assertion of collective and diffuse
rights claims, including features that support, at both an aspirational
and a conceptual level, ideas like collective and diffuse claims. Lev
reminds us that for Hobbes, worried as he always was by the possible
reignition of unrest leading to civil war, government was needed exactly
because of the inherent tension between self-interest and common good,
such that government existed to protect the latter from the unbridled
exercise of the former. 72 In the case of Locke, as discussed above, the
72. See SOVEREIGNTY AND LIBERTY: A STUDY OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF POWER, supra
note 12, at 65 ("Hobbes goes on to explain ...
the opposition of self-interest and common
good. As the common people care not for the common good of society, they renounce their
part in government. Having grown tired of attending the public courts, 'as dwelling far
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pre-eminent concern was the preservation of property and the
individual and collective well-being that accompanies it. To that end,
Locke placed focus on the power given from "the People" to society and
what this meant in terms of the community impact and the expanse of
73
authority vested in the legislature.
Admittedly, for both classical contract theorists examined here,
while they recognized and discussed the political, social, and economic
role of collective interests and property, 74 there is no identified judicial
or dispute resolution mechanism for collective action when those goods
are infringed upon or denied. However, it must be remembered that
neither theorist was terribly specific about the particular contours of
what we now know as access to justice. Rather, what mattered to them
was the insistence that justice can be granted only when conflicts are
decided by impartial third parties. Thus, on the challenging questions of
collective or diffuse rights claims, class membership, or the timing for
the opening and closing of the class, their theories leave us without the
conceptual tools to build a solid theoretical defense of the claims.
Moreover, for both thinkers, when an interest is denied, the recourse to
an impartial third party is conceived as an action taken by an individual
to assert a claim in that individual's defense when a right has been
violated. Given the dominance and longstanding influence of classical
contract theory in Western political life and practice, it is perhaps no
surprise that in so many different nations and contexts, standing rules
stress the importance of an aggrieved individual asserting their claim, a
requirement that presents significant challenges for the successful
assertion of collective and diffuse rights claims. In the case of claims
asserted on behalf of persons who either do not have the information or
technical knowledge and tools, much less the financial and personal
resources, to advance individual claims, this fierce adherence to an
individualist position has proven debilitating to collective and
diffuse theories.
Furthermore, as discussed in Part I, for both Hobbes and Locke, the
sovereign is the source of the laws that establish the rules according to
which civil society operates. To advance any sort of collective or diffuse
off, or preferring to dedicate themselves to their own affairs, the members of the
commonwealth assemble again, this time only to institute a restricted form of government
by which they are absolved from the burden of exercising sovereignty.").
73. See, e.g., LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, supra note 8, § 243, at 445-46.
74. See, e.g., HOBBES LEVIATHAN, supra note 6, at 119-21; id. at § 89, at 343 ("Whereever therefore any number of Men are so united into one Society, as to quit every one of
his Executive Power of the Law of Nature, and to resign it to the publick, there and there
only is a Political, or Civil Society. And this is done where-ever any number of Men, in the
state of Nature, enter into Society to make one People, one Body Politick under one
Supreme Government..").
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interest claim, this feature of their thought is problematic, since as the
modern world demonstrates, the sovereign is frequently a source of
collective and diffuse harms. 75 Hobbes's theory is especially problematic,
given his strong conviction in the rightness of an absolute monarchy,
whose decisions as to what constitutes right and wrong may not be
criticized once selected. In the case of Locke, his theory permits greater
flexibility in this regard, since he favors a constitutional monarchy, and,
therefore, the legislature may have greater powers to limit the authority
and permit orderly dissent-and thus to permit vindication of rights
even against the sovereign.
Yet as also argued above, with respect to this faith in sovereign
powers, for neither thinker was that authority absolute, especially when
it challenged the peace and order, broadly conceived, of the
commonwealth-in the most literal sense of that word. More positively,
there are aspects of the theories of both classical contract theorists that
could be used to construct a more solid architecture to support collective
and diffuse rights claims. While each philosopher evinces a
contractarian notion of right vindication by which the harmed
individual only has the right to pursue an equitable claim, as I have
attempted to indicate here, the arc of their arguments also suggests
openings to begin thinking about the underlying justifications for
collective and diffuse claims. Their work does this in three
principal respects.
First, both philosophers demonstrate great respect not only for
individual rights to the products of one's labor, but also for the need to
protect the common-wealth. As Hobbes famously wrote in Chapter XXIV
of Leviathan: "For where there is no Common-wealth, there is . . . a

perpetuall warre of every man against his neighbor . . . ...76 Hobbes
makes it clear that the common-wealth is characterized by laws
established by the sovereign and particularly those that distribute
"materials" forming what we know as property rights.77 The sovereign's
decisions cannot be challenged, but it is crucial to remember that even
the sovereign, in the Hobbesian worldview, was subject to God's laws
and to the law of nature in a Christian polity. The sovereign's power
was thus not absolute.78 The sovereign is responsible, for example, for

75. Consider, for instance, the problem of unregulated air pollution. Only the sovereign
has the power to reduce a harm that is generated by most members of a society. Thus, the
sovereign is both source of and the possible solution to such harms.
76. HOBBES LEVIATHAN, supra note 6, at 171.
77. Id. at 171-75.
78. See HOBBES LEVIATHAN, supra note 6, at 231; JOHN HOBBES, DE CIVE:
PILosoPHcAL RuDIMENTs CONCERNING

GOVERNMENT AND

Warrender ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1983) (1642).
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focusing on the interests of the whole and not favoring any one member
of the polity.79 This belief provides another principle useful in
conceptualizing and defending a defense of the notion of access to justice
for collective and diffuse rights.
For his part, Locke allows for dissolving the constituted
governmental authority because "no Man or Society of Men, having a
Power to deliver up their Preservation, . . . to the Absolute Will and
arbitrary Dominion of another . . . ."s0 Indeed, says Locke, men can

always act "to rid themselves of those who invade this Fundamental,
Sacred, and unalterable Law of Self-Preservation,for which they enter'd
into Society." 8 Thus, "Locke provides a justification, not of private
property, but, rather, of the English Common." 82 Though an oblique
defense, it is nonetheless a defense of a notion of shared interests that
merit protection. This provides yet another factor that could be decisive
in a theoretical defense, consistent with classical contract theory, of
what we now call collective and diffuse rights.
Second, both Hobbes and Locke demonstrate a deep respect for
God's creation. Hobbes, for example, in A Dialogue Between a
Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England, makes
83
clear the moral basis of law according to Christian principles. Part of
the exchange between a student-a Lawyer-and a Philosopher, goes as
follows:
L[awyer]: ...

I find a great fault in your definition of

law; which is, that every law either forbiddeth or
commandeth something. It is true that the moral law is
always a command or a prohibition, or at least implieth
it. But in the Levitical law, where it is said that he that
stealeth a sheep shall restore fourfold, what command or
prohibition lieth in these words?
P[hilosopher]: Such sentences as that are not in
themselves general, but judgments; nevertheless, there
is in those words implied a commandment to the judge,
to cause to be made a fourfold restitution. 84

79. DE CIVE, supra note 78, at 157.
80. LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, supra note 8, § 149, at 385.
8 1. Id.
82. TULLY, supranote 3, at 130.
83. See HOBBES, A DialogueBetween a Philosopherand a Student of the Common Laws
of England, supra note 21.
84. Id. at 28-29.
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In the context of this analysis, the exchange is of interest for three
reasons. The first of these is that the moral command is the basis for a
legal judgment. Even for the authority-respecting Hobbes, actions that
violated what we today conceive of as human rights form the basis of
law. The second of these is that the Levitical principle-the example
selected by Hobbes-demonstrates a recognition that resources need to
be husbanded with care and, if they are not, suffer the draconian
Biblical punishment. Finally, and third, even judges, normally
subordinate to the sovereign, are bound to follow commandments
superior to the interests of individual actors, even an actor who is a
sovereign. All three reasons could be used to buttress an architecture to
defend the notion of collective and diffuse rights.
The third and final respect in which the works of Hobbes and Locke
help us to begin thinking about the underlying justifications of collective
and diffuse claims is in their emphasis on equity. In the same Dialogue
discussed above, the Philosopher (who has the answers and we can
assume stands in for Hobbes) stresses that "the common-law is nothing
else but equity."8 5 As discussed in Part I, the idea that he should so
emphasize equity, or the rightful redistribution of entitlements as the
ultimate purpose of the common law and not some other goal (e.g.,
public order, retribution, punishment) also holds promise for
constructing a legal foundation for the robust defense of collective and
diffuse rights claims. Moreover, one should never forget in Hobbes his
view that "the safety of the people is the highest law."8 6 While it would

be anachronistic to define "safety" as more than the desire for public
peace and order so that individuals were secure in their persons and
possessions, the view also helps point toward a principle to help secure
access to justice for collective and diffuse rights claims. That is, "safety"
could serve as a principal justification to combat mass financial fraud,
consumer harms, and environmental harms.
Fourth and finally, it merits reflecting on Locke's view of money as a
key driver for law. Men in society got on well in the Lockean world prior
to the invention of specie. The inequalities and avarice money
introduced necessitated stricter controls on human behaviors. Many of
the harms that have given rise to collective and diffuse rights claims,
similarly, from financial swindles to toxic contaminations, result from
the same human impulse to exploit. Locke's justification for the social
contract, therefore, can also be used in the service of an architecture to
support collective and diffuse rights claims.

85. Id. at 58.
86. Id. at 70.
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CONCLUSION

As stressed at the outset of this analysis and several times in this
text, collective and diffuse rights claims were not concepts available to
the classical contract theorists. To suggest otherwise would be
anachronistic in the extreme. Moreover, as the above reflections have
endeavored to show, many of the assumptions of their worlds were
entirely different than those of our political discourse and social reality,
from the foundational beliefs in a Christian polity to an understanding
of a natural world blessed with unlimited resources. Nonetheless, as
also indicated above, aspects of their thought provide solid theoretical
justifications that can be used in the articulation of a more solid
architecture in the defense of collective and diffuse rights claims, which
can be widely vindicated when breached. However, as also argued here,
to do so requires rejecting key elements of the classical contractarian
understanding, such as the focus on defending a limited and highly
individualistic vision of rights vindication.
Conversely, the contra-egalitarian impulses of Hobbes and Locke
need be recognized when undertaking any effort to apply their theories
in the collective and diffuse rights context. As argued at the outset, and
despite differences in their thought, these impulses constitute key
baseline assumptions on which their ideas are constructed and from
which they are elaborated. Such assumptions conflict with aims central
to collective and diffuse rights claims, to the extent that such claims aim
to promote, through equitable redistribution of opportunities, great
political, social, and economic equality. Thus, any such effort to use
aspects of their theories must squarely face this limitation and measure
its dimension. If contract theory is to retain explanatory power for our
notion of access to justice, it is essential to sort these matters out. The
potential to assert collective and diffuse rights claims needs be
increasingly available in our evermore crowded, industrialized,
urbanized, and dirty world, one in which individuals and communities
are often far removed geographically and socially from those whose
decisions shape their lives. This analysis therefore has endeavored to
argue that two of the leading contractarian theorists' ideas do not
preclude the assertion of such claims. Indeed, a careful reading of the
classical contractarians points us in a possible direction, while also
identifying some features of their theories that may no longer have
robust explanatory power for our current reality.

